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POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Alan Meisel*
Pointing out recent problems caused by political surveillance, the author traces
the historicalorigins of the fourth amendment as afoundationfor a constitutional
challenge to such activity. Mr. Meisel also appraises other possible remedies
against unauthorizedsurveillancefor politicalpurposes and the problems of implementation.-The Editors
The right of the people to be secure in theirpersons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonablesearches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrantsshall issue, but upon probable cause, supportedby Oath or affirmation,
and particularlydescribing the place to be searched,and the persons or things to
be seized.'

Numerous examples have come to light in recent years, and especially in recent months, of instances of surveillance activities carried out
by government agents. Some of the disclosures have come from the

agents who conducted the surveillance,' some from the subjects of the
surveillance.' Surveillance efforts have taken a variety of forms:4 informers, wiretaps, electronic listening devices, bugged informers, and
photography are a few of the more common methods. Nor have the

objectives of the surveillance been unidimensional. While much surveillance is undertaken for the prevention and detection of crime, perhaps

as frequently it is employed to suppress opposition to official government policy.

The efforts of law enforcement officials and executive policy mak* B.A. 1968, J.D. 1972, Yale University. The author is a member of the Connecticut and
Pennsylvania Bars and Research Associate in Law and Psychiatry at Western Psychiatric Institute
and Clinic, University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine.
1. U.S. CON ST. amend. IV.
2. See Arnold, Hunt Links White House and C.I.A. to Burglary in EllsbergInquiry, N.Y.
Times, May 5, 1973, at I, col. 5; Roberts, Informer Says Police PromptRadicalActs,N.Y. Times,
Oct. 25, 1971, at 22, col. 2; Smith, I.R.S. Team Collects Data on Extremistsfor Tax Use, N. Y.
Times, Jan. 13, 1972, at I, col. 6; Wall, Special Agent for the FBI, N.Y. Review of Books, Jan.
27, 1972, at 12; Halloran, An Expert in Counterintelligence-ChristopherHowland Pyle, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 25, 1971, at 14, col. 3.
3. For example, the major television networks have produced and broadcast three programs
dealing with surveillance within a recent one-month period in which numerous individuals gave
accounts of having discovered that they had been the victims of official surveillance. C.B.S.
Reports, Under Surveillance, Dec. 23, 1971; A.B.C., Assault on Privacy, Jan. 8, 1972; N.E.T.,

Surveillance, Who's Watching, Jan. 31, 1972.
4. E.g., the parabolic microphone, miniaturized electronic transmitters and receivers, and
the laser beam are some of the more sophisticated and pervasive techniques. See A. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, ch. 4 (1967); A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY, ch. 1 (1970).
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ers to silence voices expressing doubt or disagreement, or which potentially may express disagreement, with official policies is a problem of
major significance today. While it may be of immediate concern only
to a relatively small number of outspoken individuals and groups, any
strategy to suppress political dissent will inevitably have unfortunate
longer-range consequences for greater numbers of individuals, if not for
the socio-political structure of the entire society. The use of Internal
Revenue Service audits against political foes of the incumbent administration; 5 the employment of agents provocateurs to incite acts which will
in turn create a backlash of repressive sentiment;' the electronic bugging
of the headquarters of one of the national political parties by agents
either in the employ of the other party or of the government; 7 the
attempts by the Department of Justice to prevent through injunctive
proceedings the publication of the "Pentagon Papers" 8 and the ensuing
prosecution of those who admittedly made available the documents to
the press;' the political attacks by leading members of the executive
branch of the federal government, chief among them the Vice-President,
upon the communications media;"0 the attempts of a Congressional subcommittee to subpoena the.unused portions of television videotapes of
a documentary critical of the Department of Defense;" and the use of
government-paid and recruited spies to gather information on individuals and groups suspected of favoring solutions to pressing social problems different from those advocated by the official policy makers1 2 are
5. Shanahan, Panel Is Told White House Urged I.R.S. Political Acts, N. Y. Times, Jun. 28,
1973 at /,col. 6.
6. See, e.g., Donner, The Confession ofan FBI Informer, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Dec., 1973,
at 54: Janson, 17 of Camden 28 Found Not Guilty, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1973, at I, col. 2.
7. Szulc, Democratic Raid Tied to Realtor, N.Y. Times, Jun. 19, 1972, at 1,col. 7. This, of
course, is the now infamous Watergate affair.
8. See generally N.Y. Times, June 16-30, July, 1971; see also New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
9. This was the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo which ended in a mistrial
and dismissal of the prosecution as a result of "'improper government conduct' " consisting in
1"'an unprecedented series of actions' " involving illegal surveillance and conventional search and
seizure (if not theft) which was not revealed to the defendants. Arnold, Pentagon Papers Charges
are Dismissed, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
10. See Kenworthy, Agnew Says TV Networks are Distorting the News, N.Y. Times, Nov.
14, 1969, at 1,col. 2; Transcript of Address by Agnew Criticizing Television on Its Coverage of
the News, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1969, at 24, col. 1.
I1. See Gould, House Panel Bids C.B.S. Yield Films, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1971, at 1,col.
I: Gould, C.B.S. Gains Support for Defiance of Subpoena, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1971, at 41, col.
1.
12. On March 8, 1971, the local office of the F.B.I. in Media, Pennsylvania was broken into
by a group identifying itself as the "Citizens Committee to Investigate the F.B.I." Documents were
removed from the F.B.I.'s files, duplicated, and distributed to the news media revealing that the
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only a few varied examples of the actions undertaken at different levels

and by different branches of government to suppress or eliminate opposition to official policies and opinions. As Justice Douglas has stated:
[W]e are currently in the throes of another national seizure of paranoia, resembling the hysteria which surrounded the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Palmer
Raids, and the McCarthy era. Those who register dissent or who petition their
governments for redress are subjected to scrutiny by grand juries, by the FBI, or
even by the military. Their associates are interrogated. Their homes are bugged
and their telephones are wiretapped. They are befriended
by secret government
3
informers. Their patriotism and loyalty are questioned.

It is probably futile and inconclusive" to discuss the frequently made
contentions that government repression is greater today than at any
other time in this nation's history, that government repression is as great
as or greater than that in so called totalitarian nations, or that technological improvements in the methods of surveillance render the efforts
of governmental suppression activities more effective and pervasive than
ever before.15 What is of primary importance is the development of

methods, both political and legal, for the control of any and all efforts
of officialdom to repress legitimately expressed dissent. The reason is
clear: "More than our privacy is implicated. Also at stake is the reach

of the Government's power to intimidate its critics."

6

It is the thesis of this article that the fourth amendment to the

Qonstitution provides a foundation for the development of a doctrine
for the control of governmentally inspired surveillance. In addition to
their obvious application to trespassory searches and seizures of tangible
objects, the safeguards of the fourth amendment have already been
construed to apply to wiretapping 7 and to non-trespassory electronic
eavesdropping."8 On the other hand, the Court has explicitly rejected the
surveillance practices of government agencies were deliberate, systematic, and officially sanctioned-and often conducted for the illegitimate purposes of suppressing political expression as
well as for uncovering evidence of crime. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1971, at 24, col. 3. The "Media
Papers," as the purloined documents have come to be known, have been published in full in WIN,
March 1 & 15, 1972. WIN is a twice-monthly publication of the War Resisters League of Rifton,
N.Y.
13. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407
U.S. 297, 329-31 (Douglas, J., concurring) [hereinafter cited as United States v. United States
District Court].
14. See id. at 297, text accompanying n.10.
15.

Compare Powell, 'America is Not a Repressive Society', N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1971 at

47, col. I, with Dershowitz, Powell's Nomination, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1971, at 46, col. 3, and
with Dorsen, A Response to Mr. Powell, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1971, at 45, col. 3.
16. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 331.
17. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
18. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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application of the Fourth Amendment to electronic eavesdropping,
whether trespassory"9 or non-trespassory, ° accomplished by means of a
"bugged" informer. And when surveillance occurs in the context of
"political" expression, the case for the expansion of fourth amendment
protection is even more compelling than where ordinary "criminal"
2
activity is under surveillance. 1
The scope of this article will of necessity be limited. The effort here
will be directed toward designing-or, perhaps, more humbly put, discerning-fourth amendment policies and safeguards against the use by
law enforcement officials and other government operatives of surveillance techniques to suppress dissenting ideas, opinions, policies, and
personal and social associations.
I. THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The historical background against which the fourth amendment was
drafted and incorporated into the Bill of Rights suggests that surveillance conducted by government agents is subject to the limitations upon
governmental power embodied in the fourth amendment. In the century
between the English civil war and the American Revolution, agents of
the British crown utilized two devices-writs of assistance22 and general
warrants 2 3-to unearth evidence of criminal offenses. These devices had
19. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
20. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
21. The distinction between "political" and "ordinary" or "traditional" crimes is one that
eludes facile embodiment in words. See note 37 infra. However, Mr. Justice Powell, speaking for
a unanimous Court, recognized the distinction, though without attempting to explain it. See United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 313.
22. The statute of 13-14 Charles II, ch. II, § 5 (1662) empowered revenue officers to employ
writs of assistance to search for smuggled goods. The writs were general in nature, failing to specify
what places were to be searched, but rather leaving it to the absolute discretion of the official
conducting the search to determine the circumstances under which the writ was to be executed.
See generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, ch. 2 (1937); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34
HARV. L. REV. 360, 364-65 (1921); 2 T. MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 24547 (1863): Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886).
23. The use of general warrants was first authorized by 13-14 Charles 11, ch. 33, § 15 (1662).
These warrants, condemned as an "abuse which had crept into the administration of public affairs," Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 625, were issued and used when a seditious libel was
known to have been published but the identity of the libeler was not definitely established. Searches
would be made of the premises of numerous suspected persons, often founded upon less than
suspicion, to discover the identity of the person who had committed the offense so that he might
be made to answer for the misdeed. See, e.g., the account of Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell State
Trials 1153 (1763) in 2 T. MAY, supra note 22 at 246:
The magistrate, who should have sought proofs of crime, deputed this office to his
messengers. Armed with their roving commission, they set forth in quest of unknown
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the effect of arbitrarily invading individual privacy and personal security.
In response to one particularly obnoxious use of a general warrant,
John Wilkes, a member of the Commons and an outspoken critic of the

Crown, who had been arrested pursuant to a general warrant and whose
drawers had been ransacked and papers removed, challenged the validity of the general warrants.2 4 In pronouncing general warrants illegal,

Lord Mansfield explained in another case that "[ilt is not fit, that the
judging of the information should be left to the discretion of the officer.

The magistrate ought to judge; and should give certain directions to the
officer. '

25

2 6 because
In the equally famous case of Entick v. Carrington,

the papers seized were not specified in the warrant prior to seizure and
because they had not previously been determined by a magistrate to be
criminal in nature, the warrant was declared invalid, for, as Lord Camden stated, if the warrant should be said to be legal, "the secret cabinets
and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the
search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state
shall see fit to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author,

printer, or publisher of a seditious libel."
Justice Bradley, writing in Boyd v. United States,2s indicated that
the statesmen of the colonial period were familiar with the hated writs
of assistance and general warrants, 9 and with the decisions of the British
c~urts severely restricting their use. Thus, the fourth amendment was

drafted to affirm the right of personal security and privacy against any
intrusions upon those interests by government officials.A0 If a search
offenders; and unable to take evidence, listened to rumors, idle tales, and curious guesses.
They held in their hands the liberty of every man whom they were pleased to suspect. Nor
were they trilers in their work. In three days they arrested no less than forty-nine persons
on suspicion ...
See also id. at 245-52; Lasson, supra, note 22, ch. 1: Fraenkel, supra note 22 at 361-64.
24. Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell State Trials 1153 (1763); see also Wilkes Case, 19 Howell
State Trials 1075 (1763-1770).
25. Leach v. Three of the King's Messengers, 19 Howell State Trials 1001, 1027 (1765).
26. 19 Howell State Trials 1030 (1765).
27. Id. at 1030.
28. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
29. The historian and commentator James Otis, evidently reflecting public sentiment extant
at the time of their use, declared the writs of assistance to be "'the worst instrument of arbitrary
power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was
found in an English law book,' since they place 'the liberty of every man in the hands of every
petty officer.'" Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 625, quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF

THE AMERICAN UNION 301-03 (1868) [hereinafter cited as COOLEY].
30. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 781-82 n.17 and cases cited (1971) (Harlan, J.,
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and seizure was deemed to be unreasonable, it was absolutely pro-

scribed. If, however, a search and seizure was "reasonable," it could still
3
not be undertaken unless certain minimum requirements were met. '
The circumstances of the eighteenth-century cases in which incipient fourth amendment principles and interests were nurtured acquire an
ironical importance from a contemporary perspective. Since the cases
involved the search for and seizure of printed pamphlets, the publication
of which constituted the criminal offense of seditious libel, both the use
of general warrants and the subsequent controls imposed upon them by
the English judiciary developed in the context of political offenses-the
expression of political opposition to the government.3 2 The prosecutions in which the seized papers were destined to be used were attempts
by the government to suppress opposition to its policies-a motive similar to the snooping by many government agencies today.

II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE UPDATED
While the roots of the fourth amendment are deeply embedded in the
use of general warrants to suppress political opposition to the government, the growth and development of the fourth amendment have occurred almost entirely in the context of ordinary criminal offenses having no political ramifications. Yet, while the existing case law of search
and seizure has developed almost exclusively in the context of the use
dissenting); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10 (1948); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
The classic exposition of the purposes and importance of the warrant requirement is
to be found in the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in his opinion for the Court in Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14...:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . The right of officers to thrust
themselves into a home is . . . a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society
which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right
of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by ajudicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent."
United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 781-82 n.17 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. A search and seizure had to be authorized by a magistrate, whose duty it was to issue a
warrant only after hearing competent evidence-not rumor and gossip-capable of satisfying him
that a crime had been committed and that the premises sought to be searched would yield "criminal" items. Furthermore, the manner of execution of the warrant was not to be entrusted solely to
the King's messengers, but instead the magistrate was charged with the obligation of setting forth
with specificity in the warrant the identity of the items which could be seized and where they could
be expected to be found.
32. COOLEY, supra, note 29 at 300.
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of surveillance by government agents as a crime control technique-that
is, to detect and prevent the commission of criminal offenses-searches
and seizures have also been practiced by the government to suppress
33

political opposition.
Where no criminal prosecution has been instituted, the possibility
of a successful challenge to the use of surveillance brought by the subjects of the surveillance is rendered more difficult than where the government first initiates a prosecution. While the volume of litigation
challenging the use of political surveillance has not been great, a few

suits have been commenced against the practice. 34 In instances where

33. Political "dissidence" may involve orthodox criminal offenses such as rioting, murder,
assault, etc., or offenses of allegiance such as treason, espionage, and sedition, or inchoate offenses.
Wherever the line between strictly criminal offenses and strictly political offenses may lie, see note
37 infra, it is clear that surveillance techniques are used against persons who have not committed
and who are not even suspected of having committed any criminal offense for the purposes of
deterring the exercise of First Amendment rights, or satisfying certain psychological or bureaucratic urges of the persons authorizing and conducting the surveillance and that the use of such
techniques for these purposes is illicit:
[T]he government seems to approach these dissident domestic organizations in the same
fashion that it deals with unfriendly foreign powers. The government cannot act in this
manner when only domestic political organizations are involved, even if those organizations
espouse views which are inconsistent with our present form of government. To do so is to
ride roughshod over numerous political freedoms which have long received constitutional
protection. The government can, of course, investigate and prosecute criminal violations
whenever these organizations, or rather their individual members, step over the line of
political theory and general advocacy and commit illegal acts.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 757 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting, quoting Judge Ferguson
in United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 429 (C.D. Cal. 1971)).
34. See cases collected at ACLU ANNUAL REPORT 7/70-71, PoliticalSurveillance, Civil
Liberties, Dec. 1971, at 7, cols. 1-4; Lubasch, Group HereSues on Surveillance, N.Y. Times, May
19, 1971, at 22, col. 3; Lubasch, PoliticalActivists Win Round in Court Against Police Surveillance, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1972, § I, at 36, col. 2. See also Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super.
545, 256 A.2d 298 (1969), rev'd. 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970).
Litigation challenging the use of political surveillance has been sparse for several possible
reasons. First, the volume of prosecutions in which surveillance has been used for political purposes
may be relatively small in comparison with the total number of criminal prosecutions that occur,
in part because political surveillance is often conducted with no prosecutorial objective (or only a
very remote one) in mind. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 318-19,
citing Govt. Brief, pp. 15-16, 23-24 and Govt. Reply Brief, pp. 2-3, and partially because of the
infrequency with which it unearths evidence of a criminal violation that could be prosecuted. Id.
at 313 n. 14 (of 655 conversations intercepted in 1970, 45% were "incriminating"). Second, political
surveillance, unlike surveillance in cases of a strictly traditional criminal nature, is often conducted
for the bureaucratic purpose of filling dossiers, or for the less benign purpose of satisfying the
voyeuristic or paranoid urges of government officials, or with the even more malevolent object of
suppressing political dissent by instilling in the dissenters fear of exercising their right of free
expression, rather than for the sole legitimate purposes of detection and prevent of crime. See A
Nation in Fear, THE PROGRESSIVE, Feb. 1971, at 18, 19-20. Third, because political surveillance
so infrequently culminates in a prosecution, there is often difficulty in determining when it has
actually occurred. See notes 71 & 74 infra.
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there has been police surveillance of a public meeting, suits have been
grounded in first amendment theories. 35 Where the challenge has been
brought under the fourth amendment, there has been difficulty in convincing courts that the warrant procedure should apply, since persons
speaking at public meetings are deemed to have knowingly and intentionally relinquished a claim to privacy. In fact they have usually sought
not privacy but publicity, a value which the fourth amendment was not
intended to protect.3"
The problem in mounting a constitutional challenge to political
surveillance, if there is one at all, is that of applying rules developed in
the realm of criminal surveillance to instances where surveillance is
utilized for political purposes.3 There is certainly no language in the
fourth amendment to suggest that the safeguards embodied in its provisions are any less applicable to surveillance conducted for political purposes than to surveillance the objective of which is the prevention or
35. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Local 309 v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948).
36. See, e.g.. United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969). The court held that
admission in evidence of statements made by the defendant at a public meeting to which reporters
were admitted did not violate defendant's rights to privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
"Reliance on the electronic surveillance cases is misplaced..." because there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy. Id. at 664; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); United
States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969). These issues are probably more properly framed
in First Amendment terms. See, e.g., Local 309 v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948);
Donnelly, Judicial Controlof Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons,and Agent Provocateurs,60 YALE
L. J. 1091, 1128-31 (1951); see also Comment, Chilling Political Expression by Use of Police
Intelligence Files: Anderson v. Sills. 5 HARV. Civ. RTS.-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 71, 85 (1970); but see
Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 44950 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Very narrowly speaking, the use of surveillance techniques for "political" purposes-that
is, "political surveillance"-may be said to occur when government officials place an individual
under surveillance in order indirectly or directly to stifle his political beliefs and/or expressions of
them. More generally, however, the term "political" is also used as a shorthand phrase to designate
the constellation of reasons why surveillance is practiced aside from the detection and prevention
of crime, see generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6061, 63-114 (Vintage ed. 1966); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 328-36
(Vintage ed. 1970); Emerson, The FederalBureau of Investigation and the Bill of Rights, 2 YALE
REV. OF LAW & Soc. ACTION 169, 176-77 (No. 2, 1971), including the instilling of fear, the
satisfaction of paranoid or voyeuristic desires of the government agents, the filling of dossiers for
presently unknown, though possibly sinister, future purposes, and for harassment.
Undoubtedly the use of surveillance to detect or prevent crime and its use for political purposes
represent two points on the surveillance continuum and may be indistinguishable, or at least
overlapping, in some instances. However, the definition of what is and what is not a "political"
offense is not within the scope of the present discussion. The formulation of such a definition
requires extensive consideration of the meaning of the term "speech" as it is used in the First
Amendment. See generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1966); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (1970); Emerson, PoliticalTrials,
I YALE REV. OF LAW & Soc. ACTION 6 (Nos. 2 & 3, 1970).
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detection of criminal activity. It should not be forgotten that the great

fear of unreasonable searches and seizures held by the Framers grew out
of their experience with the hated general warrants of the agents of the
British sovereigns, which were more often than not employed for the
purpose of suppressing political dissent or for the prosecution of political offenses. Without a judicially issued warrant the eighteenth-century
constable who wished to obtain evidence that an individual had expressed disfavored political views was no more entitled to break down
that person's door to seize his diary or pamphlets than he was to invade
the privacy of a man's home to seize stolen or contraband articles.
Likewise, the modern political dissident who uses, for example, a telephone-as well as the traditional means such as meetings, discussions,
and publications-to express his political beliefs is at least as deserving
of the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable 3 8search and
seizure as is one suspected of engaging in criminal activity.
Furthermore, when the activity intruded upon is "political" rather
than "criminal" in nature,39 fourth amendment safeguards must be
applied with far greater stringency as a result of what Professor Emerson terms the "umbrella effect" of the first amendment." Since the
conversation sought to be overheard via the bugged informer is political
expression or belief and thus enjoys an unusual degree of protection
against governmental interference under the first amendment, the fourth
38. "The Fourth Amendment . . .was designed not to protect criminals but to protect the
privacy and security of all citizens." United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 760 (Douglas J.,dissenting). Also, when electronic surveillance is employed, even under the strictest of limitations, the
agents conducting it have no way of determining in advance the precise time at which the conversations authorized to be seized will occur. Thus, as a matter of practical necessity they are forced to
intercept all conversations in order to obtain the ones "specified" in the warrant. See Osborn v.
United States, 384 U.S. 323, 353 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. at 333 n.14 (Douglas, J., concurring): Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan); Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering
Processin Organized Crime Cases: A PreliminaryAnalysis, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME

80, 92 (1967). It is no wonder that Justice Douglas has called electronic surveillance "the greatest
of all invasions of privacy . . .[since] it places a government agent in the bedroom, in the business
conference, in the social hour, in the lawyer's office-everywhere and anywhere a 'bug' can be
placed." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64-65 (1967) (concurring opinion).
39. See notes 21 & 37 supra.
40. Professor Emerson has written that
the courts have come to give these constitutional guarantees [of protection against unreasonable search and seizure, privilege against self-incrimination, and due process rules against
vagueness and overbreadth in legislation, to cite only the more prominent ones] a substantially different meaning when invoked in behalf of First Amendment rights. Thus the First
Amendment has an umbrella effect, drawing within its shelter doctrines from many other
areas of the law.
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (Vintage ed. 1971).
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amendment must be applied in a more careful and exacting fashion."
In effect, a zone of privacy is created by the convergence of these two
constitutional provisions, a realm into which the government may not
intrude without prior judicial authorization.
In the most recent case involving the search and seizure of political
expression, United States v. United States District Courtfor the Eastern District of Michigan (Keith),4" the Court demonstrated its sensitivity
to the first amendment's umbrella effect in a fourth amendment context.
In an 8-0 decision it reaffirmed the ancient view that the determination
of whether or not to conduct a search and seizure-especially an electronic one in the context of "national security"-is a judicial, not an
executive, function and that as a consequence a warrant must be obtained to conduct surveillance which the government describes as involving a domestic threat to national security.
This case grew out of an indictment of persons for conspiracy to
destroy government property. Prior to trial the defendants moved to
compel the government to disclose information that it was alleged to
have obtained as a result of warrantless electronic eavesdropping. The
government admitted that it had engaged in electronic surveillance of
the defendants but claimed that prior judicial authorization was not
required because, since the defendants were suspected of engaging in
activities detrimental to national security, the eavesdrops were "lawful
• . . as a reasonable exercise of the President's power (exercised through
the Attorney General) to protect the national security. '4 3 The district
court rejected the government's contention, concluded that the surveillance was in violation of the fourth amendment for lack of judicial
authorization, and ordered that the evidence be disclosed. 4 When the
government's petition for a writ of mandamus to set aside the order was
denied by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,45 the stage was
set for review by the Supreme Court.
41. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961);see also Roaden v. Kentucky,.
(1973). Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968); A Quantity of Books v.
U.S. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
Professor Emerson states that in cases in which the umbrella effect came into play,
the result [did not] turn squarely on a determination that the [governmental action] violated
the First Amendment. But . . . First Amendment considerations were an important factor
in leading [the Court] to enforce other constitutional safeguards with particular stringency. . . . Thus the First Amendment played a supporting, though not principal, role.
EMERSON, supra, note 40 at 154-55.
42. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
43. Id. at 301.
44. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
45. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

19731

In broad terms, the Court was confronted by the issue of the power
of the President, acting through his designate the Attorney General, to

authorize electronic surveillance in "national security" cases without
first seeking and obtaining judicial approval." To state and locate the
issue in the context of prior eavesdropping cases,47 the Court addressed
itself to the "question left open by Katz":
"Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy
the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security ....
s

In the forefront of the Court's framework for the resolution of this issue
was the recognition that
[n]ational security cases .
often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth
Amendment values not present in cases of "ordinary" crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater
jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech."

The Court first held without merit the government's reliance on
§ 2511(3) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 5 -which provides that nothing in the Act is intended to limit the
President's constitutional power "to protect the United States against
the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or
against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence

of the Government" 5 -in

support of its argument that the President

may conduct warrantless electronic eavesdrops in national security
cases. The Court read § 2511(3) as saying "that if the President has such
46. 407 U.S. at 299.
47. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), Chief Justice Taft speaking for the
Court held that because the process of wiretapping had involved no "physical invasion" of a
constitutionally protected area, wiretapping could not be said to constitute a search and seizure,
and hence no warrant was required to engage in it. Furthermore, since the Fourth Amendment
applies by its terms only to tangible objects, even a wiretap involving a physical invasion does not
require a warrant because a procedure which does not yield a tangible object is not "unreasonable." Although the rules pronounced in Olmstead had begun to break down in Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (abandoning the physical invasion requirement) and in Wang
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (dispensing with the tangible objects requirement), it
was not formally overruled until the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz
held that non-trespassory electronic surveillance required, to be constitutionally acceptable, the
issuance of a warrant by a neutral magistrate since the method of search and seizure violated the
defendant's "reasonable expectation of privacy." This is the test of Fourth Amendment applicability currently employed by the Court. But see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (dissenting
opinion of Justice Harlan).
48. 407 U.S. at 309.
49. Id. at 313.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970).
51.

Id.
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a power, then its exercise is in no way affected by" the Act.52 Congress,
in enacting § 2511(3), merely intended to express neutrality on the issue
of the constitutional authority of the executive to conduct warrantless
searches in instances of suspected domestic subversion,5 3 and it properly entrusted the resolution of the issue to the Supreme Court.
Beginning with the basic postulate that "the Fourth Amendment
is not absolute in its terms," 54 the Court balanced the competing interests at stake in order to arrive at its determination of whether a new
exception to the general Fourth Amendment rule requiring warrants
ought to be permitted. While the government had placed strong emphasis in the Court of Appeals on the "inherent" powers of the executive
to conduct warrantless electronic surveillances, 5 it realized the weakness of this position and relied more heavily in the Supreme Court on
the contentions (I) that courts lack the competence to evaluate the
" 'large number of complex and subtle factors' "I involved in deciding
whether or not to conduct surveillance activities in national security
cases and (2) that disclosure of information to a magistrate in the process of obtaining a warrant "'would create serious potential dangers to
the national security and to the lives of informants and agents' "51 since
"prior judicial authorization would create a greater 'danger of leaks. . . because
in addition to the judge, you have the clerk, the stenographer and some other
official like a law assistant or bailiff who may be apprised of the nature' of the
surveillance."58

Though declaring that it did not reject these arguments "lightly," the
Court appeared to be predisposed against them, however, since it had
stated earlier in its opinion that
Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when the targets of
official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political
beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts
to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect "domestic security." 5

Not surprisingly, the argument that the courts are incompetent to evalu52. 407 U.S. at 307, quoting Senator Hart's explanation of § 2511(3) in the Senate debates
on the bill. 114 CONG. REC. 14751 (daily ed. May 23, 1968).
53. 407 U.S. at 308.
54. Id. at 314.

55. 444 F.2d at 658-61.
56. 407 U.S. at 319, quoting Govt. Reply Brief, p. 4.
57. Id.. quoting Govt. Brief, pp. 24-25.
58. Id.
59. 407 U.S. at 314.
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ate questions of national security was categorically and quickly rejected
almost as an insult to the judiciary. 0 The Court devoted slightly more
effort to meeting the government's argument that breaches of confidentiality might pose a danger to life and to national security. However,
by stating that the same considerations exist in cases of ordinary criminal offenses but have never posed a significant threat to law enforcement
efforts,"t the Court was equally firm in rejecting this claim. It did not
even address the government's final claim that because national security
surveillances "are directed primarily to the collecting and maintaining
of intelligence . . . and are not an attempt to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions, ' ' 2 no warrant should be required. 3
It could almost be said that the Court was less than forthright,
although through no fault of its own, when it stated that it would apply
a balancing test to the resolution of the problem at hand. The pans of
the balance were so disproportionately weighted that the "balancing"
was illusory. Since the government's claims were so weak and the competing interest of the defendants' privacy so strong, the result of striking
the balance in favor of the protection of individual privacy was little
short of a foregone conclusion.
III. REMEDIES FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED USE OF SURVEILLANCE
While the imposition of a warrant requirement for the conduct of political surveillance implements the underlying purpose and policy of the
fourth amendment-the protection of personal security and privacy
against arbitrary invasion from government officials-there is still no
assurance that government officials who conduct surveillance activities
will satisfactorily comply with the warrant procedure.64 It is not unlikely
that some surveillance activities will continue to be conducted without
judicial approval, or possibly that warrants will be obtained illegally
60. "If the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey
its significance to a court, one may question whether there is probable cause for surveillance." Id.
at 320.
61. Id. at 321.
62. Id. at 318-19.
63. The basis of this claim implicitly appears to be that the Fourth Amendment comes into
play only where there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed.
64. See, e.g., the studies of police compliance with the requirements of the Miranda decision
which strongly indicate that nearly perfect compliance, while the ideal, is far from the reality.
Project, Interrogationsin New Haven: The Impact of Miranda,76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967): Seeburger & Wettick, Mirandain Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1(1967); Medalie,
Leitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to
Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968); see also Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscript to
the Miranda Project: Interrogationof Draft Protestors,77 YALE L. J. 300 (1967).
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through fraud, collusion, perjury, or some combination of these evils.
Thus, remedies are needed for a demonstrated failure of government
officials to obtain a warrant where one is required, remedies to make
whole the person whose privacy has been invaded and to act as a deterrent to other unauthorized intrusions.
In cases where a prosecution is eventually commenced, the evidentiary remedies of the Weeks and Mapp cases65 ought to be adequate to
assure that evidence obtained through unwarranted surveillance operations will not be used in the proof of the government's case. It is likely,
though, that many surveillance activities will unearth either insufficient
evidence to prosecute or evidence of activities which, while not illegal,
are still the subject of official interest. Here the exclusionary rule is of
no value to the individual whose privacy has been subjected to an unwarranted intrusion. The traditional remedies of monetary damages and
criminal sanctions are available in circumstances such as these. 6 However, neither of these remedies has in the past proved to be very successful, 7 and both their deterrent and compensatory value are open to question. A statutory right of action 8 against the governmental entity that
employed the individuals who conducted the illegal surveillance would
at least enhance the possibility of compensating the victims of the surveillance by eliminating the problem of the judgment-proof defendant.
65. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see
generally Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
579 (1968).
66. An action for damages by a person who has been subjected to illegal surveillance is
authorized in some instances by the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Acts of 1968, 18
U.S.C. § 2520 (1970), and may also be based upon a violation of constitutional rights. Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Where the action is against state
officials, a right of action is provided by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1970). See Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961). Criminal prosecutions against government agents for the violation of civil
rights are authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970). See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
67. A survey of actions for damages against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 revealed
that during a 17-year period (1951-1967) only 53 reported cases survived a motion to dismiss.
Ginger & Bell, Police Misconduct Litigation-PlaintiffsRemedies, 15 AM. JUR. TRIALS 555, 58090 (1968). Prosecuting government officials is also likely to be an illusory remedy. See Moses v.
Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963) (an unsuccessful attempt to compel by mandamus
Attorney General Kennedy to prosecute Mississippi officials alleged to have deprived the petitioners of their federal civil rights).
68. See, e.g., S. 2657, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), as amended Dec. 13, 1971; Christie,
Government Surveillance and Individual Freedom; A Proposed Statutory Response to Laird v.
Tatum and the Broader Problemof Government Surveillanceof the Individual,47 N.Y.U.L. REV.
871 (1972) (§ 10a of proposed "Freedom from Surveillance Act"); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2.2(a) (tentative draft, 1968) (authorizing
a civil cause of action against any person or governmental agency for illegal electronic surveillance).
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However, it seems that the greater bar to recovery has not been financial

insolvency of defendants but a judicial unwillingness to entertain damage actions for violation of civil rights. 9 Finally, injunctive relief is also
available to prevent the continuance of illegal governmental surveillance.70
The effectiveness of any remedy, whether presently existing or proposed, is severely limited at the outset by the threshold problem of
discovering when illegal surveillance has in fact occurred. Because surveillance activities are ordinarily conducted surreptitiously, detection of
them usually requires extraordinary diligence, and it is often only fortui-

tous that their existence comes to light at all.71 Because the invocation
of a remedy against unwarranted, and therefore unconstitutional, surveillance depends in all cases upon the exposure of the existence of

surveillance activity, mechanisms for discovering that illegal surveillance has occurred are needed as much as, if not more than, remedies
for the surveillance itself.
At present, a limited mechanism exists for the discovery of illegal
surveillance. The routine motion for discovery and inspection 2 may
reveal the existence of surveillance insofar as it has resulted in and is
therefore evidenced by a tangible object such as a tape recording. In
some instances, the government may prefer to drop charges rather than
reveal the product of the surveillance or indeed the fact that illegal
surveillance was even conducted. Unfortunately, this mechanism is only
available in cases where a prosecution has been commenced-which
probably constitute only a very small proportion of all instances in

which electronic surveillance has been employed 73-and even then it is
69. A statute which requires an individual to disclose information concerning the commission of a crime but which fails to confer immunity from prosecution upon the individual obligated
to make the disclosure might run afoul of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
See United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1968). See Ginger & Bell, Police Misconduct
Litigation-Plaintiffs Remedies, supra note 67.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Gomez
v. Layton, 394 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see generally Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy
for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968); Comment, Federal Injunctive
Relief From Illegal Search, 1967 WASH. U. L. Q. 104.
71. The prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo for the disclosure of classified
documents to the press ended in a dismissal of the charges when it was learned that an illegal
burglary of the office of the psychiatrist of one of the defendants had tainted the evidence in the
case. However, more than a year of pre-trial and trial proceedings during which motions for
disclosure and inspection were made elapsed before the existence of the burglary became known
and then only as a result of hearings in the seemingly unrelated Watergate investigation. See
generally N.Y. Times, Apr. & May, 1973.
72. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
73. Though the total number of intercepts authorized by state and federal judges pursuant
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often difficult to obtain governmental compliance with the motion either
as a result of prosecutorial obstinacy or prosecutorial ignorance of the
use of illegal surveillance by the investigative apparatus of the government.74
Another method available and, as recent events indicate, robustly
operating to unearth illegal surveillance is the free press. Without the
investigative activities of reporters and journalists, it is quite possible
that the far-reaching magnitude of illegal surveillance during the past
few years would never have seen the light of day. However, these same
events-most notably the Watergate trials and hearings and the dismissal of criminal charges against Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo
for the release of the Pentagon Papers-make clear that additional
mechanisms for detecting illegal surveillance are needed and long overdue. The limitation of the free press as a mode of discovery is that it is
likely to operate only in the most egregious cases of illegal surveillance,
perhaps overlooking the smaller and less sensational cases which, nevertheless, pose no less a threat to the erosion of civil liberties.
Possibly the most effective means for bringing to light the existence
of illegal surveillance would be the imposition by statute of an affirmative obligation upon all persons having or obtaining knowledge of the
existence of the surveillance to disclose that knowledge to specified
prosecutorial or investigative officials. Because illegal surveillance carried on by government agents constitutes not merely a private injury to
those whose privacy and personal security are disturbed but a public
to Tit. III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act was 597 in 1970, each
surveillance may involve intercept of hundreds of different conversations. The average
intercept in 1970 involved 44 people and 655 conversations of which 295 or 45% were
incriminating. Cong. Rec. Vol. 117, § 6477, May 10, 1971.
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 313 n.14. The government's briefs in
that case admit that surveillance is often undertaken with no prosecutorial objective. Id. at 31819.
74. The difficulty of learning of the existence of illicit electronic surveillance is apparent from
the oral argument in Berger v. New York, 35 U.S.L.W. 3361, 3363 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1967).
The Chief Justice . . . tried to find out how a person against whom one of these devices
has been used gets to know about it in the first place. Mr. Uviller [arguing for respondent
New York] said there is no statutory requirement for notice to the defendant in such
situations but that there is usually an informal discussion between the prosecuting attorney
and defense counsel. He ultimately finds what information was obtained through proceedings on a motion to suppress.
In rebuttal, Mr. Brill [counsel for petitioner] informed the Court that it took considerable
digging for him to find out that his client's conversations had been bugged. He insisted that
the prosecution did not give him anything.
See also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Kohn, 2d Circuit Criticizes U.S. for
Approach to Wiretaps, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 31, 1973, at I, col. 3.
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injury resulting from the undermining of the legitimacy and credibility
of the government, the effect of such a disclosure statute would be to
satisfy the right of the public to be adequately informed as well as the
right of the injured individual to obtain redress for the illegal surveillance. Subjecting to criminal and/or civil prosecution any individual
with knowledge of illegal surveillance who fails to disclose such information hopefully would facilitate the injured individual's invocation of his
remedies.
Additionally, there already exist procedures for compelling the disclosure of illegal surveillance. In the case of prosecutors who willfully
withhold such information, the contempt power75 and disbarment proceedings are methods for assisting disclosure. Where disclosure is
impeded by the failure of investigative agents to inform prosecutors that
the evidence they have provided is tainted by the use of illegal surveillance, the prosecutors might still be subjected to disciplinary action by
the court and the bar for failure to exercise reasonable diligence in
ascertaining the tainted nature of the government's evidence. Finally,
persons with knowledge of illegal surveillance might presently be subject
to a variety of criminal penalties for failure to disclose that information
even in the absence of any specific statutory obligation requiring disclosure. An individual possessing information relating to the commission
of a crime may be liable to prosecution as an accessory after the fact."
In addition, it is misprision of a felony to conceal knowledge of the
commission of a felony, punishable as a misdemeanor. 7 The same conduct in some cases may also constitute obstruction of justice and is
78
subject to more severe penalties.
Needless to say, all of the foregoing procedures for encouraging
disclosure of information obtained through illegal surveillance involve
the same difficulty of implementation as the remedies for illegal surveillance which the discovery procedures are designed to aid. In order to
impose penalties for failing to disclose the fact of illegal surveillance, it
must first be known that the surveillance has occurred which, if known
in the first instance, would have obviated the need to penalize for failure
75. 18 U.S.C. § 401, 402 (1970).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). Mere failure to report the commission of a crime is not a misprision. Some affirmative act of concealment is also required. United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694
(9th Cir. 1968); Neal v. United States, 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 679
(1940). It is therefore arguable that absent an affirmative statutory obligation to report knowledge
of the commission of illegal surveillance there could not be a successful prosecution for misprision
of the individual who fails to report.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1970).
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to disclose. In other words, so long as silence is absolute and completely
maintained, it is unlikely that the existence of illegal, surreptitious surveillance will come to light. However, the existence of sanctions for
failure to disclose may aid in destroying the conspiracy of silence necessary to maintain secrecy, though possibly to no greater extent than the
penalties for conducting the illegal surveillance itself.
CONCLUSION

The United States District Court case has left the scope of the
warrant protection of the fourth amendment considerably clearer and
broader. The door left ajar in Katz has been firmly fastened shut by the
Court leaving only the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement, which are based upon practical necessity, and the still unconfronted question of the power of the executive to conduct warrantless
surveillances of foreign agents in national security cases.7" It is also clear
that courts are no less competent to evaluate the appropriateness of a
search and seizure in an internal security case than in a case of "ordinary" crime. In fact, judicial scrutiny is all the more essential because
of the presence of first amendment considerations. But most significant
is the fact that the government's attempt to revitalize the general warrant in the guise of national security has been decisively thwarted. No
more will the incantation of the mystical phrase "national security"
shield the government from the necessity of obtaining a warrant. Political surveillance, like an orthodox search and seizure, requires the full
protection of the fourth amendment, if not a fuller protection bolstered
by the first amendment.
The task of implementing the right to be free from government
surveillance will in the long run prove to be more difficult than was the
task of establishing the right. Even if the extremely difficult barrier to
the implementation of remedies for illegal surveillance can be overcome-that is, discovery of the existence of the surveillance-criminal
penalties and monetary awards can never truly compensate the individual for the loss of dignity suffered as a consequence of a surreptitious
invasion of privacy. And as long as the detection of surveillance faces
grave technological and legal obstacles, there may be little effective
deterrent to the use of illegal surveillance. In the final analysis, therefore, the application of the warrant requirement to political surveil79. Since this question was not presented in United States v. United States District Court,
though its existence and unsettled state were acknowledged, it was specifically left unresolved. 407
U.S. at 308-09 & n.8.
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lance-as in all other forms of search and seizure for which it is
required"' - necessitates the same kind of voluntary and good faith
compliance by governmental officials with constitutionally sanctioned
procedures as do all other instances of the implementation of fundamental rights of the individual. Sadly, the events of recent years and months

indicate the paucity of bona fides among our elected officials and their
appointed assistants.
80. Of course a warrant issued to conduct political surveillance, regardless of the particular
surveillance technique utilized, possesses all the infirmities and limitations for the protection of
the privacy of the individual as does a warrant issued in a purely criminal context.
The protections afforded by warrant procedure are (1) a neutral, judicial determination of the
existence of probable cause, (2) limitation of the time during, the purposes for, and the circumstances under which it may be used, and (3) a written record of the issuance proceedings. See
generally Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Title III, Omnibus Crime Control & Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (1970); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 21415 (1966); Blakey, supra note 38, at 97.
However, in actual practice many of these so-called protections prove to be illusory as a result
of (I) the pro forma issuance of warrants, (2) warrants issued on the basis of hearsay evidence, (3)
warrants issued without the disclosure of the identity of informers, and (4) lack of notice to the
subject of the search and seizure of its execution. See generally W. LA. FAVE, ARREST: THE
DECISION To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 502-03 (Remington ed. 1965); Barret, Criminal
Justice: The Problem in Mass Production in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION
85 (H.W. Jones ed. 1965): Chevigny, Police Abuses in Connection with the Law of Search and
Seizure, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (1969); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L. J. 139
(1970).
On balance the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment probably provides a greater
degree of protection to the political dissident than a warrantless surveillance since the decision as
to whether or not the surveillance will be conducted ultimately will be made by a disinterested court
rather than by a partisan policeman or prosecutor. Because the distinction between a criminal
offense and the expression of dissident beliefs may often be a quite delicate one, it ought to be
entrusted to an impartial magistrate, rather than to those engaged in the business of ferreting out
crime. See, e.g., the so-called "plot" to kidnap Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger, which may
have been no more than idle conversation, frivolous discourse, or philosophical musing. Kifner,
7he Berrigan Affair: How it Evolved, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1971, at 1, 56, col. 7. At least two
lower courts have held that a warrant need not be obtained to conduct a wiretap of "foreign"
intelligence. United States v. Brown,
F.2d (5th Cir. 1973); Zweibon v. Mitchell,
F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1973) ("domestic" activities posing a threat to "foreign" relations).

